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AS is always true in the area of construction law, the most signifi-Acant cases arising during the survey period cut across a broad
Jspectrum of legal issues. Contractual disputes and interpreta-
tions, personal injury and liability, governmental rights and immunities,
competitive bidding procedures, and statutory enactments are among the
items of interest promulgated in the past year. As always, the potential
exists that the authors' view of what is and is not a noteworthy case may
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differ from the opinion of the reader, and apologies are therefore ex-
tended to those whose favorite case may have been omitted.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In the aftermath of Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University,' the issue
of sovereign immunity continues to be a source of keen interest to con-
tractors and the practitioners of construction law. In Federal Sign, the
Texas Supreme Court indicated in a footnote that "[t]here may be other
circumstances where the State may waive its immunity by conduct other
than simply executing a contract so that it is not always immune from suit
when it contracts."'2 Taking this footnote at face value, the Austin Court
of Appeals has decided a number of recent cases, each touching on the
Federal Sign footnote.
In Aer-Aerontron, Inc. v. Texas Department of Transportation,3 the
court held that the state had waived its sovereign immunity by its egre-
gious conduct in ordering and accepting police radios and then refusing
payment. Later, in Little-Tex Insulation Co. v. General Services Commis-
sion,4 and Texas Natural Resources Conservation Commission v. IT-
Davy,5 the Austin court in both cases reinforced the position that the
state can waive its sovereign immunity in a breach of contract action by
its conduct, especially where the state accepts goods or services pursuant
to a contract and then refuses payment.
A recent case in which the court did not find a waiver of the state's
shield of sovereign immunity was Tsumi, Inc. v. Texas Parks & Wildlife
Department.6 This case involved an oral contract for the creation and
distribution of mail-order gift catalogs. Prior to bringing suit, the contrac-
tor did not seek legislative permission to sue, nor did it contend that a
statutory right to sue existed. Tsumi relied on the Federal Sign footnote
and filed suit stating that the state through certain conduct had waived
the protection of sovereign immunity. The court, while acknowledging
this proposition, found that the contractor brought insufficient factual al-
legations to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
A majority of the cases decided by the Third Court of Appeals in Aus-
tin clearly indicate the fallout from the Federal Sign decision. The state's
execution of a contract to pay for services rendered, coupled with its ac-
ceptance of those goods and services without paying for them, can be
seen as a waiver of the state's immunity to be sued. As a result, sovereign
immunity may not provide the categorical shield sought and expected by
state agencies. However, as stated in last year's Survey, until this matter
is settled, this area of construction law will continue to spark interest and
1. 951 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. 1997).
2. Id. at 408 n.1.
3. 997 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
4. 997 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
5. 998 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet.).
6. No. 03-99-00205-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 1265 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 25,
2000, no pet. h.), rule 53.7(f) motion filed (Apr. 10, 2000).
[Vol. 53
CONSTRUCTION LAW
controversy. In addition to the case law, the Legislature attempted to
address the issue of sovereign immunity during the 76th Legislative Ses-
sion, which is discussed later in this article.
II. MECHANIC'S LIENS
The long-held Texas rule has been that where a construction contract is
entered into by a lessee tenant, and not by the lessor owner, the lien
rights of the contractor will be limited to a claim against the leasehold
interest of the tenant. As a result, attempts to establish a lien on the
owner's property are routinely rejected. Contrary to Texas case law go-
ing back decades, the Houston Court of Appeals has provided a new
pathway for those providing improvements to a tenant to assert lien
rights against the owner's fee estate.
In Bond v. Kagan-Edelman Enterprise,7 the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's decision and held that a tenant's contractor was entitled
to a lien claim on the owner's entire shopping center. In Bond, the con-
tractor was hired by the tenant to complete the interior construction of a
restaurant. The court analyzed the case not only from the potential
agency issue of the relationship between the tenant and the owner (con-
sistent With the generalized exception), but also concentrated on the lease
provisions between the owner and the tenant.
The Bond court found that because the lease contained specified con-
tingencies related to the construction of certain improvements (which
were to be completed by the tenant), the terms of the lease were in fact a
general construction contract between the owner and tenant. The court
concluded that the instrument did not become a lease until the fulfillment
of the condition precedent (i.e., completion of the construction of the res-
taurant). Therefore, the court construed the owner-tenant relationship to
be that of an owner-general contractor at the time of the filing of the lien.
Consequently, the tenant's contractor was not limited to a claim against
the tenant or the tenant's property interest, but was afforded the lien
rights available to a lower-tier subcontractor claimant against the owner
of the shopping center. In reaching such a conclusion, the Bond decision
has lowered the apparent threshold that a contractor must pass in order
to file a lien, not only on the leasehold interest of the tenant, but also on
the fee interest of the owner.
III. FAIR NOTICE DOCTRINE
In Douglas Cablevision IV, L.P. v. Southwestern Electric Power Co.,8
the Texarkana Court of Appeals followed the conspicuousness require-
ment of Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc.,9 whereby ordi-
7. 985 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.) reh'g overruled
(Feb. 25, 1999), Rule 53.7(f) motion filed (Mar. 31, 1999).
8. 992 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. App.-Texarkana, 1999, pet. denied).
9. 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993).
2000]
SMU LAW REVIEW
nary risk-shifting clauses, such as indemnification provisions, must be
conspicuous enough in their presentation for a reasonable person to have
noticed them. The indemnification clause in Douglas Cablevision was not
highlighted, in larger print, or underlined. Southwestern Electric Power
("SWEPCO"), the indemnitee, contended that the fact that the indemni-
fication provision in its contract comprised two pages of a thirteen-page
document in and of itself demonstrated it was a significant portion of the
contract and, as such, was conspicuous. 10 The court rejected this argu-
ment, stating:
All of the twenty-two numbered paragraphs, including paragraph
seventeen which includes the indemnity provision, are printed in the
same size and type of font. None of the paragraphs are preceded
with any kind of descriptive heading. The actual language which re-
quires Douglas to indemnify SWEPCO is contained in two sentences
spanning roughly one-half page of a thirteen-page document. The
indemnity provision was no more visible than any other provision in
the agreement and does not appear to be designed to draw the atten-
tion of a reasonable person against whom the clause was to operate.
We find that the clause was not conspicuous and did not comply with
the fair notice requirement.11
In Lexington Insurance Co. v. W. M. Kellogg Co.,12 it was held that the
release of a contractor from liability for known and unknown claims did
not apply to a contractor's future negligence. Therefore, the release did
not need to comply with the Fair Notice Doctrine of Dresser. The case
involved a dispute over a "closed-out" agreement after the contractor
had already entered into a contract under which the contractor was to
design, engineer, and construct an efethylene manufacturing facility.
During the project, a dispute arose regarding the work performed by the
contractor. At the completion of the project, the parties executed a
"Project Close-Out Settlement Agreement" which provided that the
owner would "hereby and forever release, acquit, and discharge [contrac-
tor] of and from any and all claims, actions or causes of action, known or
unknown" arising out of the contract. The terms of the Agreement were
challenged on the grounds that the release language was not sufficiently
conspicuous to provide fair notice. The court respected the claim, and in
doing so, pointed out that the requirements of Dresser specifically state
that its decision "applies the fair notice requirements to indemnity agree-
ments and releases only when such exculpatory agreements are utilized to
relieve a party of liability for its own negligence in advance.' 3
The court emphasized that a "close-out" agreement releasing the con-
tractor from liability was drafted and executed after the acts that could
give rise to the liability were completed. 14 Further, the agreement was
10. See Douglas Cablevision, 992 S.W.2d at 507.
11. Id. at 509.
12. 976 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).




signed after the construction of the plant had been completed, and the
dispute arose during the construction, which was before the agreement
was signed. Therefore, the Lexington court held that the Fair Notice
Doctrine under Dresser was inapplicable to the case. The clear indication
in Lexington is that the potential future discovery of "unknown" matters
included within the release is alone insufficient to constitute an agree-
ment or release "in advance."
IV. BIDDING
The San Antonio Court of Appeals upheld a clause in a bid package
barring the contractor's claims against the architect based on the archi-
tect's evaluation or recommendation of the contractor's bid in Sedona
Contracting, Inc. v. Ford, Powell & Carson, Inc.15 In Sedona, a bidder's
suit against an architectural firm that recommended rejection of its low
bid on the grounds of tortious interference with business relations, defa-
mation, and negligence, was dismissed on waiver grounds. The Northeast
Independent School hired the architectural firm of Ford, Powell & Car-
son, Inc. to design and supervise the construction of improvements to a
high school. Sedona Contracting, Inc. submitted the low bid. However,
the architect recommended to the school district that it not award Sedona
the contract, saying that the contractor was not qualified. Thereafter,
Sedona presented evidence that it was a qualified and responsible bidder,
but the contract was nevertheless subsequently awarded to the second
lowest bidder.1 6
The court dismissed Sedona's claim for defamation and interference
with its business relations, citing a clause in the bid documents which pro-
vided and required that "each bidder agrees to waive any claim it has or
may have against the Owner, the Architect-Engineer, and their respective
employees, arising out of or in connection with the administration, evalu-
ation, or recommendation of any bid."'17 The appellate court held that
Sedona's participation in the bidding process was consent not only to be-
ing rejected, but also to the possibility of an intentional tort.' 8
Sedona's alternative argument that the foregoing provision was against
public policy and unenforceable was also rejected. The court disagreed
with Sedona's interpretation, stating that:
[i]f we were to open an architectural firm or engineering firm to lia-
bility for their recommendation, we would negate the process of
finding a qualified contractor. We agree with [architect] that such a
result would eviscerate the competitive bidding process, and relegate
the process to a battle of numbers.19
15. 995 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
16. See id. at 194-95.
17. Id. at 194.
18. See id. at 196.




In Bright v. Dow Chemical Co.,20 the Houston Court of Appeals held
that an owner who supervises an independent contractor's work for com-
pliance or safety rules may be liable for injuries suffered by the contrac-
tor's employees. In this case, the plaintiff was a carpenter for the general
contractor that was retained to build a gas compressor unit for the owner,
Dow Chemical. The contract between Dow Chemical and the general
contractor required that the contractor provide all materials and stated
that the general contractor was an independent contractor.2' The plain-
tiff's arm was crushed when a pipe fell as he was removing plywood forms
for a concrete pier. The pipe that fell had been put in place by another
employee of the general contractor, but the Plaintiff alleged that the
owner was negligent in overseeing the work being performed by the gen-
eral contractor on the project.
The plaintiff argued that Dow Chemical had the right to control and
supervise the work and to oversee safety on the job site. The Court of
Appeals noted that supervisory control, such as that alleged by the plain-
tiff, "must relate to the activity that actually caused the injury, and [must]
grant the owner at least the power to direct the order in which the work is
to be done, or the power to forbid it being done in an unsafe manner. '22
In this case, the owner's representative testified in a pre-trial deposition
that he supervised the work being done to ensure that it was done safely,
and that he had the authority to prevent the general contractor from do-
ing work he felt was unsafe.23
The owner pointed out that the general contractor had its own safety
representative on site who was responsible for seeing to it that all of the
general contractor's employees complied with all applicable safety rules
and requirements. However, the court stated that it could not ignore the
evidence indicating that the owner retained some supervisory control
over the general contractor's work on the premises. Since the owner had
the power to forbid work being done in an unsafe manner, the court ruled
that the owner owed a duty to the general contractor's employees to ex-
ercise supervisory control with reasonable care.24
In Koch Refining Co. v. Chapa,25 the Texas Supreme Court overturned
a decision holding that an owner's placement of a "safety man" on a job
site creates a duty to employees of an independent contractor. The court
relied on its holdings in Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendez26 in respond-
ing to the claims that the owner's safety employees had instructed the
independent contractor to perform in a safe manner, because requiring
an independent contractor to "observe and promote compliance with
20. 1 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
21. See id. at 790-91.
22. Id. at 790.
23. See id. at 791.
24. See id.
25. 11 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. 1999).
26. 967 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1998).
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Federal laws ... and other standard safety precautions" does not impose
an unqualified duty of care to ensure that an independent contractor's
employees work safely. 27 Also, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the "possibility of control" by an owner constitutes evi-
dence of the owner's "right to control" in Coastal Marine Services v.
Lawrence.28
In Laurel v. Herschap,29 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held a gen-
eral contractor to be liable for two types of negligence in failing to keep
the premises safe: (1) that arising from an activity on the premises, and
(2) that arising from a premises defect. To recover on a negligent activity
theory, the plaintiff would have to "establish that he was injured by or as
a contemporaneous result of the activity itself rather than by a condition
created by the activity."' 30 The plaintiff testified at his deposition that he
was injured by a falling pipe that fell less than sixty seconds after the
general contractor's employee directed another subcontractor's employee
to stop working.31
In this case, an employee of the subcontractor that supplied pipe to the
general contractor was injured when a pipe fell on him during the course
of the project. The allegation was made that an employee of the general
contractor was responsible for the stoppage in moving the pipe supplies,
which in turn caused the fall of the pipe onto the injured plaintiff. Given
such facts, the Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff's injury was a
contemporaneous result of the general contractor's employee's allegedly
negligent activity of directing that the worker stop.32 The court then went
on to observe that a general contractor does not usually have a duty to
insure that a subcontractor performs work in a safe manner. If, however,
the general contractor exercises some control over the subcontractor's
work, the general contractor may be liable unless it exercises reasonable
care in supervising the activity. "Retaining the power to direct the order
of the work to be performed or to forbid it from being performed in a
dangerous manner is a sufficient exercise of control to give rise to a duty
to exercise reasonable care." 33
A court outside the jurisdiction of the state of Texas presented an inter-
esting case regarding a job site inspection by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA"). In L.R. Willson & Sons, Inc. v. Occu-
pational Safety & Health Review Commission,34 a steel erection contrac-
tor was renovating the Orange County Civic Center in Orlando, Florida
when Joseph Dear, then head of OSHA, happened to be staying in a
hotel across from the civic center. From his hotel room, Mr. Dear viewed
27. Koch, 11 S.W.3d at 156.
28. 988 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1990).
29. 5 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1999, no pet.).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 802.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. 134 F.3d 1235 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 962 (1998).
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the general contractor's employees working on the building without
proper protection. Mr. Dear then called a local OHSA inspector to re-
quest an inspection of the site. Before going to the job site, the inspector
came to the hotel and received permission from the management to go to
the roof to videotape the employees who were not using proper protec-
tion. Thereafter, the inspector went to the job site and presented his cre-
dentials to the general contractor.35
The general contractor claimed that OSHA's off-site inspection (from
the hotel roof across the street) violated its rights and asked that the evi-
dence gathered be suppressed. The Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission determined that there was no violation of the
employer's inspection rights. The Commission held that under section
8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the requirement for an
inspector to present credentials before inspecting or investigating applies
only when the inspector makes an entry onto the site of the work and not
to an inspection or an investigation conducted from an off-site location.36
While inspections in the manner and circumstances of Willson may be
uncommon, this case is of significant importance to general contractors'
counsel on OSHA matters.
VI. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE-MECHANIC'S LIENS
In the recent legislative session, the Legislature revised chapter 53 of
the Texas Property Code to clarify existing statutes concerning construc-
tion on residential properties and disclosure statements by amending the
existing language in the Texas Property Code, as follows: 37
1. The definition of "completion" from Section 53.106 to Section
53.001(15) was amended so that it applies to the entire Chapter 53,
rather than just the subchapter relating to statutory retainage. It
modifies the definition to make it clear that any type of replacement
or repair of work performed under the contract will not affect the
date of "completion" (only uncompleted work affects the date of
completion);
2. Section 53.055(a) was amended by extending the period for sending
the owner a copy of the affidavit claiming a lien from one business
day to five calendar days after the date the affidavit is filed with the
clerk;
3. Section 53.057 was amended to authorize claimants on residential
construction projects to give the notice of contractual retainage in
lieu of the Section 53.252 notice to owner (House Bill 740 had elimi-
nated the notice of contractual retainage for residential construction
projects);
35. See id. at 1237.
36. See id. at 1238-39.
37. Tex. H.B. 2054 §§ 1-14, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (to be codified as amendments to
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. ch. 53).
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4. Section 53.158 was amended to clarify the limitations periods for
non-residential and residential construction projects-for non-resi-
dential, the limitations period will be two years from the last day for
the claimant to file its lien affidavit or one year from completion,
abandonment, or termination of the original contract, whichever is
later; for residential, the limitations period will be one year from the
later of the last day for filing the affidavit or completion, abandon-
ment, or termination of the original contract (the new wording
would appear to apply to the "constitutional lien" as well);
5. Sections 53.205(a) and 53.206(a) and (b) were amended to provide
that bonds protect all individuals with a claim that relates to a resi-
dential construction project under subchapter K and specifies that a
person is not required to give notice to the surety under certain
conditions;
6. Section 53.255 was modified relating to the initial disclosure state-
ment to consumers, making it consistent with changes made in
House Bill 2054 and to clear up several ambiguities (including a
change in the language concerning "statutory retainage");
7. Section 53.256 was amended to permit the parties to waive the list of
subcontractors and suppliers on a residential construction project
(the contractor must obtain a written waiver in compliance with the
requirements of the statute); and
8. Section 53.258 was amended (and simplified) to make provisions re-
lating to the "periodic" disclosure on residential projects to require
the contractor to provide the owner, prior to the receipt of re-
quested funds, with a list of the subcontractors the contractor in-
tends to pay from such requested funds.
The Legislature also expanded the coverage of mechanic's liens to la-
bor and materials for installation of landscaping, irrigations systems, re-
tention ponds, and similar dirt work.38 As with the lien for architectural
or engineering services, the "landscaping" labor and materials must have
been furnished by the lien claimant pursuant to a written contract be-
tween the claimant and the owner (or its agent). In other words, a writ-
ten contract is required, and the lien is limited to first tier (original
contractor) claimants.
A new chapter 62 of the Texas Property Code was created to provide
for a lien on real property for unpaid, earned commissions for commer-
cial real estate brokers.39 Commercial broker's liens will be perfected in
a manner very similar to mechanic's liens (notice letter and filed affidavit
claiming a lien). The commercial broker's lien attaches as of the date the
affidavit claiming the commercial broker's lien is recorded (note:
mechanic's liens relate back to visible commencement of construction).
38. Tex. H.B. 2135, §§ 1-4, 76th Leg., R. S. (1999) (to be codified as an amendment to
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021).
39. Tex. H.B. 1052 §§ 1-2, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (to be codified at TEX. PROP. CODE
ANN. §§ 862 et seq.).
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The lien only applies to commercial projects, and a written agreement
between the owner and the broker is required.
VII. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION
The Residential Construction Liability Act (chapter 27 of the Texas
Property Code) was amended to, among other things, allow the defen-
dant (contractor) to recover attorney's fees for groundless/bad faith
claims and to require mediation of claims in excess of $7,500.40 It also
requires the claimant (consumer) to furnish the defendant (contractor)
any available evidence of the nature and extent of the alleged defect and
the required repairs. Failure to provide the defendant (contractor) with
the notice of defect and a reasonable opportunity for inspection will re-
sult in the abatement of any claim under chapter 27. On the other hand,
the cap on the contractor's liability is extended to the greater of the
purchase price of the residence or the current fair market value of the
property without the construction defect. Further, all contracts subject to
chapter 27 must include a statutory disclosure informing the consumer of
the mandatory provisions of chapter 27 (required notice and opportunity
for inspection) as a prerequisite to any suit under the chapter for a con-
struction defect.
VIII. PROMPT PAY ACT
The "Prompt Pay Statute" was amended for private works projects
(Chapter 28, Texas Property Code). 41 It reduces the time (from 45 days
to 35 days) for an owner to pay the contractor the amount "allowed
under the contract" for properly performed work or furnished materials,
including specially fabricated materials. It also gives contractors and sub-
contractors the right to suspend work (notwithstanding any provision in
the contract to the contrary) for nonpayment upon ten days written no-
tice to the owner (and the lender in some situations). A contractor or
subcontractor who suspends work does not have to return to work until
the amount wrongfully withheld is paid and the contractor or subcontrac-
tor is reimbursed for reasonable demobilization and remobilization ex-
pense. Further, a contractor or subcontractor who suspends work will not
be liable for any costs or damages of such suspension unless the contrac-
tor or subcontractor was notified before suspension of a good faith dis-
pute as to the funds withheld.
IX. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY/DISPUTE RESOLUTION
State agencies are now required to establish dispute resolution proce-
40. See Tex. S.B. 506 §§ 1-10, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (to be codified as an amendment
to TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 27 et seq.).
41. Tex. H.B. 1522 §§ 1-6, 76th Leg. R.S. (1999) (to be codified as an amendment to
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 28 et seq.).
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dures for contractual disputes with contractors. 42 If these procedures fail
to resolve the dispute, the contractor may request a contested case hear-
ing before the State Office of Administrative Hearings. The contractor is
limited to the recovery of unpaid contract funds and may not recover
consequential damages, extended overhead, or attorney's fees. If the
award is less than $250,000, the state agency is required to pay the award
from appropriated funds. If the award is $250,000 or more, the adminis-
trative law judge must issue a written opinion with findings of fact and
may recommend payment or rejection of payment, in whole or in part, to
the Legislature. In the case of the larger award, the contractor will have
to seek an appropriation from the Legislature for payment or consent
from the Legislature to file suit against the State. This is obviously less
than the contracting community was seeking in response to the sovereign
immunity issue, but it does at least provide a mechanism for a contractor
to obtain an impartial judicial determination of a breach of contract claim
which will result in payment for the smaller awards and will enhance pay-
ment for the larger claims.
42. See Tex. H.B. 826 §§1-15, 76th Leg. R.S. (1999) (to be codified as amendments to
TEX. Gov. CODE ANN. §§ 441 et seq.; TEX. LOCAL Gov. CODE ANN. §§ 2208 et seq.; TEX.
Gov. CODE ANN. § 2209, et. seq.).
2000]
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